Price fixing relates not only to prices, but also to other terms that affect prices to consumers, such as shipping fees, warranties, discount programs, or financing rates. Antitrust scrutiny may occur when competitors discuss the following topics:
- Present or future prices
- Pricing policies
- Terms or conditions of sale, including credit terms
- Identity of customers
- Allocation of customers or sales areas
- Production quotas
- R&D plans
Price fixing is an agreement (written, verbal, or inferred from conduct) among competitors that raises, lowers, or stabilizes prices or competitive terms. Generally, the antitrust laws require that each company establish prices and other terms on its own, without agreeing with a competitor. When consumers make choices about what products and services to buy, they expect that the price has been determined freely on the basis of supply and demand, not by an agreement among competitors. When competitors agree to restrict competition, the result is often higher prices. Accordingly, fixing prices is a major concern of government antitrust enforcement.
A plain agreement among competitors to fix prices is almost always illegal, whether prices are fixed at a minimum, maximum, or within some range. Illegal fixing occurs whenever two or more competitors agree to take actions that have the effect of raising, lowering or stabilizing the price of any product or service without any legitimate justification. Price-fixing schemes are often worked out in secret and can be hard to uncover, but an agreement can be discovered from “circumstantial” evidence. For example, if direct competitors have a pattern of unexplained identical contract terms or price behavior together with other factors (such as the lack of legitimate business explanation), unlawful fixing of prices may be the reason. Invitations to coordinate prices also can raise concerns, as when one competitor announces publicly that it is willing to end a price war if its rival is willing to do the same, and the terms are so specific that competitors may view this as an offer to set prices jointly.
Not all price similarities, or price changes that occur at the same time, are the result of price fixing. On the contrary, they often result from normal market conditions. For example, prices of commodities such as wheat are often identical because the products are virtually identical, and the prices that farmers charge all rise and fall together without any agreement among them. If a drought causes the supply of wheat to decline, the price to all affected farmers will increase. An increase in consumer demand can also cause uniformly high prices for a product in limited supply.
A defendant is allowed to argue that there was no agreement, but if the government or a private party proves a plain price-fixing agreement, there is no defense to it. Defendants may not justify their behavior by arguing that the prices were reasonable to consumers, were necessary to avoid cut-throat competition, or stimulated competition.
Example: A group of competing optometrists agreed not to participate in a vision care network unless the network raised reimbursement rates for patients covered by its plan. The optometrists refused to treat patients covered by the network plan, and, eventually, the company raised reimbursement rates. The FTC said that the optometrists’ agreement was illegal and that its leaders had organized an effort to make sure other optometrists knew about and complied with the agreement.
An agreement to restrict production, sales, or output is just as illegal as direct price fixing, because reducing the supply of a product or service drives up its price. For example, the FTC challenged an agreement among competing oil importers to restrict the supply of lubricants by refusing to import or sell those products in Puerto Rico. The competitors were seeking to pressure the legislature to repeal an environmental deposit fee on lubricants, and warned of lubricant shortages and higher prices. The FTC alleged that the conspiracy was an unlawful horizontal agreement to restrict output that was inherently likely to harm competition and that had no countervailing efficiencies that would benefit consumers.
Q: The gasoline stations in my area have increased their prices the same amount and at the same time. Is that illegal?
A: A uniform, simultaneous price change could be the result of price fixing, but it could also be the result of independent business responses to the same market conditions. For example, if conditions in the international oil market cause an increase in the price of crude oil, this could lead to an increase in the wholesale price of gasoline. Local gasoline stations may respond to higher wholesale gasoline prices by increasing their prices to cover these higher costs. Other market forces, such as publicly posting current prices (as is common with most gasoline stations), encourages suppliers to adjust their own prices quickly in order not to lose sales. If there is evidence that the gasoline station operators talked to each other about increasing prices and agreed on a common pricing plan, however, that may be an antitrust violation.
Q: Our company monitors competitors’ ads, and we sometimes offer to match special discounts or sales incentives for consumers. Is this a problem?
A: No. Matching competitors’ pricing may be good business, and occurs often in highly competitive markets. Each company is free to set its own prices, and it may charge the same price as its competitors as long as the decision was not based on any agreement or coordination with a competitor.
Whenever business contracts are awarded by means of soliciting competitive bids, coordination among bidders undermines the bidding process and can be illegal. Bid rigging can take many forms, but one frequent form is when competitors agree in advance which firm will win the bid. For instance, competitors may agree to take turns being the low bidder, or sit out of a bidding round, or provide unacceptable bids to cover up a bid-rigging scheme. Other bid-rigging agreements involve subcontracting part of the main contract to the losing bidders, or forming a joint venture to submit a single bid.
Example: Three school bus companies formed a joint venture to provide transportation services under a single contract with the school district. The joint venture did not involve any beneficial integration of operations that would save money. The FTC found that the joint venture mainly operated to prevent the bus companies from offering competing bids.
Are you a procurement officer? The Department of Justice has developed a tip sheet to help you assess suspicious bidding behavior and determine when to notify the government.
Market Division or Customer Allocation
Plain agreements among competitors to divide sales territories or assign customers are almost always illegal. These arrangements are essentially agreements not to compete: “I won’t sell in your market if you don’t sell in mine.” The FTC uncovered such an agreement when two chemical companies agreed that one would not sell in North America if the other would not sell in Japan. Illegal market sharing may involve allocating a specific percentage of available business to each producer, dividing sales territories on a geographic basis, or assigning certain customers to each seller.
Q: I want to sell my business, and the buyer insists that I sign a non-compete clause? Isn’t this illegal?
A: A limited non-compete clause is a common feature of deals in which a business is sold, and courts have generally permitted such agreements when they were ancillary to the main transaction, reasonably necessary to protect the value of the assets being sold, and limited in time and area covered. There are other situations, however, in which non-compete clauses may be anticompetitive. For instance, the FTC stopped the operator of dialysis clinics from buying five clinics and paying its competitor to close three more. The purchase agreement also contained a non-compete clause that prevented the seller from opening a new clinic in the same local area for five years, and required the seller to enforce non-compete clauses in its contracts with the medical directors of the closed facilities. In this situation, the non-compete clause prevented those doctors from serving as medical directors for any new clinic in the area and reduced the chance that a new clinic would open for five years. The FTC said the agreement to close the clinics, reinforced by the agreement not to compete for five years, was an illegal agreement to eliminate competition between rivals.
Any company may, on its own, refuse to do business with another firm, but an agreement among competitors not to do business with targeted individuals or businesses may be an illegal boycott, especially if the group of competitors working together has market power. For instance, a group boycott may be used to implement an illegal price-fixing agreement. In this scenario, the competitors agree not to do business with others except on agreed-upon terms, typically with the result of raising prices. An independent decision not to offer services at prevailing prices does not raise antitrust concerns, but an agreement among competitors not to offer services at prevailing prices as a means of achieving an agreed-upon (and typically higher) price does raise antitrust concerns.
Example: The FTC has challenged the actions of several groups of competing health care providers, such as doctors, charging that their refusal to deal with insurers or other purchasers on other than jointly-agreed upon terms amounted to an illegal group boycott. For a description of these actions, read the Overview of FTC Antitrust Actions in Health Care Services and Products. The FTC also successfully challenged the group boycott of an association of competing trial lawyers to stop providing legal services to the District of Columbia for indigent criminal defendants until the District increased the fees it paid for those services. The Supreme Court upheld the FTC’s ruling in this case. 493 U.S. 411(1990).
Boycotts to prevent a firm from entering a market or to disadvantage an existing competitor are also illegal. FTC cases have involved a group of physicians charged with using a boycott to prevent a managed care organization from establishing a competing health care facility and retailers who used a boycott to force manufacturers to limit sales through a competing catalog vendor.
Boycotts targeting “price cutters” are especially likely to raise antitrust concerns, and may be achieved with the help of a common dealer or supplier. This was the case in the FTC’s action against a national toy retailer that obtained parallel agreements from several toy manufacturers not to supply low-priced “club” stores with a full range of toys. As a result of the supplier boycott organized by the large retailer, consumers had a difficult time comparing the value of different toys at different retail outlets, the kind of comparison shopping which could have driven retailers to lower their toy prices.
Boycotts for other reasons may be illegal if the boycott restricts competition and lacks a business justification. The FTC charged a group of California auto dealers with using an illegal boycott to prevent a newspaper from telling consumers how to use wholesale price information when shopping for cars. The FTC proved that the boycott affected price competition and had no reasonable justification.
Q: I am a purchasing manager and I have problems with a supplier who is always late with deliveries and won’t return my phone calls. I’ve heard that other companies have stopped doing business with him. Can I recommend that my company find another supplier, too?
A: A business can always unilaterally choose its business partners. As long as it is not part of an agreement with competitors to stop doing business with a targeted supplier, the decision not to deal with a supplier should not raise antitrust concerns.
Other Agreements Among Competitors
Other agreements among competitors that are not inherently harmful to consumers are examined under a flexible “rule of reason” standard that attempts to determine their overall competitive effect. Here the focus is on the nature of the agreement, the harm that could arise, and whether the agreement is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits.
Below are a few examples of these types of dealings with competitors that may pose competitive problems.
Agreements to restrict advertising
Truthful advertising is important in a free market system because it helps consumers compare the price and quality of products offered by competing suppliers. The FTC Act itself prohibits advertising that is false or deceptive, and the FTC vigorously enforces this standard to empower consumers to make choices in the marketplace. Competitor restrictions on the amount or content of advertising that is truthful and not deceptive may be illegal if evidence shows the restrictions have anticompetitive effects and lack reasonable business justifications.
Example: The FTC challenged a professional code adopted by a national association of arbitrators that banned virtually all forms of advertising and soliciting clients. In a consent agreement with that organization, the rules were changed so that individual members were not barred from advertising truthful information about their prices and services.
Codes of ethics
The antitrust laws do not prohibit professional associations from adopting reasonable ethical codes designed to protect the public. Such self-regulatory activity serves legitimate purposes, and in most cases can be expected to benefit, rather than to injure, competition or consumers. In some instances, however, ethical rules may be unlawful if they unreasonably restrict the ways professionals may compete. For example, a mandatory code of ethics that prevents members from competing on the basis of price or on terms other than those developed by the trade group can be an unreasonable restraint on competition.
Example: The FTC challenged an organization of store planners that sought to prevent its members from offering free or discounted design or planning services. The group’s mandatory code of ethics discouraged price competition among the planners to the detriment of consumers.
Exclusive member benefits
Business associations made up of competitors can offer their members important services and benefits that improve efficiency and reduce costs. These services and benefits can range from general industry promotion to high-tech support. But when an association of competitors withholds these benefits from would-be members that offer a competitive alternative that consumers want, the restriction may harm competition and keep prices high. This problem only occurs when members of the association have a significant market presence and it is difficult for non-members to compete without access to association-sponsored benefits.
Example: Several antitrust cases have challenged realtor board rules that restricted access to Multiple Listing Services (MLS) for advertising homes for sale. The MLS system of combining the home listings of many brokers has substantial benefits for home buyers and sellers. The initial cases invalidated realtor board membership rules that excluded certain brokers from the MLS because access to the MLS was considered key to marketing homes. More recently, FTC enforcement actions have challenged MLS policies that permit access but more subtly disfavor certain types of brokerage arrangements that offer consumers a low-cost alternative to the more traditional, full-service listing agreement. For instance, some brokers offer a limited service model, listing a home on the local MLS for a fee while handing off other aspects of the sale to the seller. The FTC has challenged the rules of several MLS organizations that excluded these brokers from popular home sale web sites. These rules limited the ways in which brokers could conduct their business and denied home sellers the benefit of having different types of listings.
Spotlight on Trade Associations
Most trade association activities are procompetitive or competitively neutral. For example, a trade association may help establish industry standards that protect the public or allow components from different manufacturers to operate together. The association also may represent its members before legislatures or government agencies, providing valuable information to inform government decisions. When these activities are done with adequate safeguards, they need not pose an antitrust risk.
But forming a trade association does not shield joint activities from antitrust scrutiny: Dealings among competitors that violate the law would still violate the law even if they were done through a trade association. For instance, it is illegal to use a trade association to control or suggest prices of members. It is illegal to use information-sharing programs, or standardized contracts, operating hours, accounting, safety codes, or transportation methods, as a disguised means of fixing prices.
One area for concern is exchanging price or other sensitive business data among competitors, whether within a trade or professional association or other industry group. Any data exchange or statistical reporting that includes current prices, or information that identifies data from individual competitors, can raise antitrust concerns if it encourages more uniform prices than otherwise would exist. In general, information reporting cost or data other than price, and historical data rather than current or future data, is less likely to raise antitrust concerns. Dissemination of aggregated data managed by an independent third party also raises fewer concerns. The FTC and DOJ have developed guidelines, known as the Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, for health care providers sharing price and cost data, and the principles in these guidelines are broadly applicable to other industries as well. The DOJ has also issued numerous business review letters relating to proposed information exchanges by various trade associations.
Q: It is my job to collect information on competitors from public sources, such as trade journals, securities filings, and press releases. I circulate my report throughout the company. Is this a problem?
A: No. Your company may collect price or other competitive information from public sources.
Q: I am a regional sales manager and I regularly get calls from an industry consultant. If I share with him our company’s plan to raise product prices, does this create a problem for my company?
A: Information about future plans should be closely guarded; disclosing future plans outside the company could alter competitors’ decisions and raise antitrust concerns. In addition, employees should be careful when sharing information they could not otherwise share with competitors through intermediaries such as a financial analyst or even a supplier. If the consultant were to share that specific information with the company’s competitors, resulting in a change in their pricing strategy, such indirect communications could be seen as facilitating an agreement if other evidence points to a coordinated strategy.
Q: The bylaws of our trade association require my company to provide sales data. What should I do?
A: Many trade associations maintain industry statistics and share the aggregated data with members. Collection of historical data by an independent third party, such as a trade association, that is then shared or reported on an aggregated basis is unlikely to raise competitive issues. Other factors can also reduce the antitrust risk.
Real Estate Competition
COMPETITION IN THE REAL ESTATE BUSINESS
Real estate professionals are changing the way they do business: offering potential buyers the chance to view detailed property listings online, using websites to gather leads on potential customers, and using the Internet to match buyers and sellers. Some are changing the “menu” of services they’re offering. More and more, consumers can choose among real estate professionals who do business on a “fee per service” basis and others who provide the full complement of services. Because buying a home is the single most important purchase many consumers will make, the Federal Trade Commission has enforced antitrust rules in the real estate business to make sure that increased competition continues to lead to more choices, better prices and stepped-up services for buyers and sellers. For instance, the Commission challenged a number of restrictive rules adopted by Multiple Listing Services (MLS) to keep low-cost and discount brokers off MLS listings and popular websites listing homes for sale.
- fixing prices
- competitor intelligence
- price fixing
- competitor intelligence
- antitrust law